In this paper, we investigate the problems of consensus-making among individuals or organizations with multiple criteria for evaluating performance when the players are supposed to be egoistic and the score for each criterion for a player is supposed to be fuzzy number. We deal with problems with fuzzy parameters from the viewpoint of experts' imprecise or fuzzy understanding of the nature of parameters in a problem-formulation process. Egoistic means that each player sticks to his/her superiority regarding the criteria. The concept that is developed in optimization leads the problem to a dilemma called 'egoists dilemma'. We examine this dilemma using cooperative fuzzy game theory and propose a solution. The scheme developed in this paper can also be applied to attaining fair cost allocations as well as benefit-cost distributions for fuzzy data.
INTRODUCTION
Consider n players each have m criteria for evaluating their competency or ability, which is represented by a fuzzy score for each criterion. As with usual classroom examination, the higher score for a criterion is, the better player is judged to perform that criterion. In this paper we formulate a fuzzy cooperative game arising from a linear programming problem with fuzzy parameters (Nishizaki and Sakawa 2000) . For example, let the players be three students A, B and C, with three criteria, linear algebra, real analysis and numerical analysis. The scores are their records for the three subjects, are fuzzy parameters. All players are supposed to be selfish in the sense that they insist on their own advantage on the scores. However, they must reach a consensus in order to get the fellowship. Similar situations exist in many societal problems. This paper uses the deterministic situation in order to propose a new scheme for allocating or imputing the given fuzzy benefit under the framework of optimization and fuzzy game. This paper is organized as follows. Firstly, the basic models are described and some properties of problem are proved. Next is a discussion of extensions to the basic model and introduction of coalitions. This is then followed by a numerical presentation of game; Finally, conclusions and some remarks are given.
BASIC MODELS OF THE GAME
We introduce the basic models and structures of the game based on Nakabayashi and Tone (2006) and Jahanshahloo et al. (2006) . . It is assumed that the higher score for a criterion is, the better player is judged to perform as regard to that criterion. Each person k has a right to choose a set of nonnegative weights
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to the criteria that are most preferable to the player. Using the weight k w , the relative scores of player k to the total score are defined as follows:
Thus using the Charnes-cooper transformation scheme by Charnes (1978) , and fuzzy game in Nishizaki (2000) this situation can be expressed using a fuzzy linear program as follows:
Where ik x% is triangular fuzzy number, in this paper, we employ a parametric approach to solving the linear programming problem with fuzzy parameters in order to construct the values of coalitions in Nishizaki (2000) .
First we introduce the α-level of the fuzzy number ik x% defined as the set ( )
in which the degree of their membership functions exceeds the level α:
Now suppose that all players consider that the degree of all the membership functions of the fuzzy number involved in the linear programming problem should be greater than or equal to a certain degree α. Then, for such a degree α, the problem can be interpreted as the following non-fuzzy linear programming problem which depends on a coefficient vector (Sakawa, 1993) .
Observe that there exists an infinite number of such a problem (4) depending on the coefficient vector
and the value of ( ) ik x is arbitrary for any
in the sense that the degree of all the membership functions for the fuzzy number in the problem (4) exceeds the level α.
However, if the players think that the problem should be solved by taking an optimistic view, the coefficient vector
in the problem (4) would be chosen so as to maximize the objective functions under the constraints.
From such a point of view, for a certain degree α, it seems to be quite natural to have understood the linear programming problem with fuzzy parameters as the following nonfuzzy α-linear programming problem: 
It should be noted that the coefficient vector ( ) ik x is treated as decision variables rather than constants. Therefore, the problem (5) is not a linear programming problem. However, from the properties of the α-level set for the vectors of fuzzy number x% it follows that the feasible regions for x% can be denoted respectively by the closed interval [ , ] L R x x . Thus, we can obtain an optimal solution to the problem (5) by solving the following linear programming problem (Sakawa, 1993) :
Conversely the players may think that the problem should be solved by taking a pessimistic view. Then taking opposite extreme points of the closed interval [ , ] L R x x , we can formulate the following problem which yields a value of the objective function smaller than that the problem (6): solution to the problem (7) and (6), respectively for givenα . Let 
The fuzzy value of the player k.
By shifting a parameter
successively, that is, 
can construct the fuzzy value ( ) c k % of the game expressed by the fuzzy number as depicted in Figure 1 .
By solving the problems (7) and (6) for all k, all the fuzzy numbers ( ) c k % are constructed. After solving this problems, if the optimal value of this problem is ( ) c k % , the problem is to maximize the objective 2 on the simplex to the weight of remaining criteria. We denote this optimal value by ( ) c k % .
The ( ) c k % indicates the highest relative fuzzy score for player k which is obtained by the optimal weight selecting behavior. The optimal weight
may differ from one player to another.
Proof
Let the optimal weight for player k be
The inequality above follows from
% and the last equality follows from the row -wise normalization. This theorem assert that , if each player sticks to his egoistic sense of value and insists on getting the portion of the benefit as designated by ( ) c k % , the sum of shares usually exceeds 1 and hence ( ) c k % cannot fulfill the role of division of the benefit. If eventually the sum of ( ) c k % turns out to be 1, all players will agree to accept the division ( ) c k % , since this is obtained by the players most preferable weight selection. The latter case will occur when all players have the same and common optimal weight selection, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 2
The equality ....
. That is, each player has the same score with respect to the m criteria.
Proof
The (if) part can be seen as follows. Since
% for all k , we have:
The (only if) part can be proved as follows. Suppose
% , otherwise the second row sum cannot attain 1.
Thus we have
Hence it holds that
This leads to a contradiction. Therefore player1 must have the same score in all criteria. The same relation must hold for the other players.
In the above case, only one criterion is needed for describing the game and the division proportional to this score is a fair division. However, such situation might occur only in rare instances. In the majority of cases, we have
Coalition with additive property
Let the coalition S be a subset of player set (1,..., ) N n = . The record for coalition S is defined by
These coalitions aim to maximize the outcomes ( ) c S % . 
Where ik x% is triangular fuzzy number, similary we can transform this program to the follow nonfuzzy program:
, 1 (14) and (15), respectively for givenα . Let
We can construct the fuzzy value ( ) c S % of the game similar to the fuzzy number as depicted in Figure 1 .
defines a characteristic function of the coalition S . Thus this game is represented by (N,c).

Definition 1
A function f is called sub -additive if for any S ⊂ N and T ⊂ N with S I T =φ the following statement holds:
Definition 2
A function f called super -additive if for any S ⊂ N and T ⊂ N With S I T =φ the following statement holds:
Theorem 3
The characteristic function c is sub -additive, for any S ⊂ N and T ⊂ N with S I T =φ we have
Proof
By renumbering the indexes, we can assume that
. For these sets, it holds that 
DEA minimum game
The opposite side of the game can be constructed by (N,d) as follows : (26) and (27), respectively for given α . Let
We can construct the fuzzy value ( ) d S % of the game similar to the fuzzy number as depicted in Figure 1 .
Theorem 6
The min game (N,d) 
Thus these game start from 
Player j wishes to maximize his score, subject to the condition that the merit of all players is nonnegative. denote optimal solution to the problem (35) and (36), respectively for given α . Let
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We can construct the fuzzy value ( ) c S % of the game similar to the fuzzy number as depicted in Figure 1 . In these programs, we keep the condition that the merit of all players is nonnegative. Since the constraints of final program are the same for all coalitions, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 8
The B-C max game satisfies a sub-additive property.
Proof
For any N S ⊂ and N T ⊂ with φ = T S I , we have: 
NUMERICAL EXAMPLE
We now apply this approach to below data. There are 5 players in this game. Each player uses 3 inferiority and 5 superiority criteria. Table 1 and Table 2 show all kinds of these inferiority and superiority criteria respectively. The results of using model (13) and (19) shows in Table ( 3).
As we can see in example, .Therefore, in this example the "Egoists dilemma" has occur and the players were not willing to negotiate with each other to attain a reasonable and fair division.
Conclusion
In this paper, we have introduced a societal dilemma called the 'egoists dilemma' and studied its properties by means of data envelopment analysis (DEA) and fuzzy game. The DEA fuzzy game thus defined has two variations, one the original selfish max fuzzy game and the min fuzzy game. Furthermore, we have studied the common weight issues that connect the fuzzy game solution with arbitrary weight selection behavior of the players for imprecise or fuzzy understanding of parameters in a problem-formulation process and have considered fuzzy linear programming games arising from the linear programming problems. Regarding this subject, we have proposed a method for compute merit of players for said data. In this sense, a numerical example have been calculated with proposed ways, has been considered.
